The U.S. credit crisis has a lot of people very concerned about the economy. (Read LATimes article on the high stakes of this problem here.) As well it should. It was a credit crisis in the 1930s which created a rash of loan failures lead to bank failures, deflation and the worst economy in American history. While we keep being assured there will not be another Great Depression, there is still reason for serious concern. Three major financial institutions have failed in the last year (Countrywide, Bear Sterns and IndyMac), and one of the world’s leading economists has predicted the worst is yet to come with at least one additional major financial institution collapsing. So, isn’t it worth asking "how did we get into this mess?"
It wasn’t long ago the big controversy was about how much the heads of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were getting paid. The argument was whether these institutions were independent banks, or government agencies. After all, they were guaranteeing FHA and similar loans, so they were using government backing as they regulated the mortgage market as well as underwrote its activities. So the question was whether the leaders should be paid like regulators – say a Federal Reserve Board member – or like executives of an independent bank. As the mortgage markets ballooned these institutions were booking more and more paper profits, and the CEO pay had gone up dramatically. Many people were questioning whether this was appropriate.
Now we can see that both institutions were allowing ever riskier loans to be made by mortgage providers. And both are near insolvency. Equity holders have been nearly wiped out as Freddie Mac’s value has dropped from $70/share to under $5 (see chart here) and Fannie Mae has dropped from $80 to $6.50 (see chart here.) Privatizing these formerly government agencies hasn’t worked out too well for investors lately.
Freddie and Fannie didn’t have bad leaders, they just kept trying to make it possible for their primary customers – the banks and mortgage companies – to keep making more and larger loans. They didn’t come out and say "we’re going to take more risk", they just slowly inched their way forward allowing loans to have less down payment, allowing the buildings to have higher valuations as collateral, allowing higher debt-to-income ratios. They didn’t start out in 1995 with the idea they would eventually be making loans for $300,000 to people who never before owned a house, had no down payment, could provide no proof of income and on an asset valuation that was 25% higher than the most recent sale. That loan would never have been approved by any bank in 1995. Or 1996. Or 2001.
But the banks and mortgage companies wanted to grow. They had a well known Success Formula. They could advertise a good rate, implement the loan application process, then sell off the loan in the secondary market with a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac guarantee. As real estate values took off, they simply needed more leniency on some of these items so they could do more loans faster and cheaper – extend their business (the back half of Defend & Extend Management). They wanted to Defend & Extend what they knew how to do. So Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae went along. And they got the big financial houses involved as well as they packaged up what were becoming increasingly risky loans.
And that’s what happens in D&E management. In order to keep growing, it is tempting to push just a little harder by trying to extend the old Success Formula. Cut a cost corner here. Take a little more risk there. Just do a little bit more of what was previously done. Everyone can see that these actions are taking them downstream. But, so far so good! Nobody has drowned yet. We might be able to see the waterfall ahead, and hear the water crashing down below a little clearer, but so far we haven’t seen any problems. So let’s try to do just a little bit more.
Of course, inevitably, D&E managers go over the waterfall – and take their customers, investors, employees, suppliers and this time the U.S. citizenry along with them. They reach just a little farther than they should have, and then it’s a free-for-all as the business gets sucked into the Whirlpool from which there will be no return.
We saw this before, when the Savings & Loan industry melted down and went away because of the ever increasing risk its leaders took. Equity holders were wiped out, and many lenders were significantly damaged despite the unprecedented government bailout at the time. In the end, we suffered a recession and a big loss of faith in real estate as the Keating 5 were tried and the S&L industry collapsed. All by trying to maintain the Lock-in, then Extend the business just a little more into some new area. And by getting the regulators to go along, the entire country and its economy end up at risk.
D&E managers don’t like risk, and intend to take risk. But because there isn’t any White Space to develop a new Success Formula they keep extending the old one. They claim they aren’t taking risk, but in fact they are. Each risk may be small, but as we’ve seen they quickly add up. These leaders start turning a blind eye to the risk as they remain Locked-in and see no other way to grow. They have to grow, and they have to remain Locked-in, so they take risks that to outsiders might look crazy. (Think about how Enron started guaranteeing its own derivatives so it could keep growing.) But Lock-in allows them to pretend the risk isn’t as great as it is. These extensions keep the Success Formula in place, and make it appear to be producing better results. But these extensions are moving closer and closer to the waterfall, and the inevitable fall into the Whirlpool. Eventually, we all must have White Space to evolve a new Success Formula, or the trip over the waterfall is inevitable.
